ABSTRACT:Studyingcryptanalysisisdifficultbecausethereisnostandardtextbook,and nowayofknowingwhichcryptanalyticproblemsaresuitablefordifferentlevelsofstudents. This paper attempts to organize the existing literature of block-cipher cryptanalysis in a way that students can use to learn cryptanalytic techniques and ways to break new algorithms.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since writing Applied Cryptography, I have been asked to recommend a book on cryptanalysis. My unfortunate answer is that while there are several good books on cryptography, there are no books, good or bad, on cryptanalysis. It is a void that I don't see being filled anytime soon; cryptanalysis is such a fast-moving field that any book of techniques would be obsolete before it was printed. And even if the book could somehow remain current, it would do little to teach cryptanalysis.
The only way to learn cryptanalysis is through practice. A student simply has to break algorithm after algorithm, inventing new techniques and modifying existing ones. Reading others' cryptanalysis results helps, but there is no substitute for experience.
This answer prompts another question: where does one get practice? The Internet is an endless source of mediocre algorithm designs, and some even creep into the academic literature, but the beginning cryptanalysis student has no way of knowing which algorithms are worth studying and which are beyond his ability. Trying to break algorithms that have already been broken (without looking at the breaks first) is the only answer. Now the question becomes: which ciphers should one try to break, and in what order? This paper is my attempt at an answer, and in this answer, I hope to facilitate the study of cryptanalysis. This is a self-study course in block-cipher cryptanalysis. With it, a student can follow a semi-ordered path through the academic literature and emerge out the other side fully capable of breaking new algorithms and publishing new cryptanalytic results.
What I have done is to list published algorithms and published cryptanalyses in a coherent order: by type of cryptanalysis and difficulty. A student's task is to read papers describing algorithms, and then attempt to reproduce published cryptanalytic results. (It is definitely more difficult to learn cryptanalysis from academic papers than from a distilled textbook, but the sooner a student gets used to reading academic papers, the better off he will be.) The results, in other published papers, serve as an "answer key."
The answer key is never definitive; it is very probable that there are other, and better, attacks than what has been published. Some cryptanalysis papers contain mistakes. Students taking this course could end up with publishable results themselves.
Even the best student will not be able to find every published break without looking at the associated cryptanalysis paper. Many of these results were discovered by some of the best cryptanalytic minds in academia. I feel that a student should spend at least a week trying to break an algorithm without looking at the cryptanalysis paper, and after that just quickly skimming the result-or just reading the abstract, introduction, and conclusion-and then again trying to break the algorithm for at least another three days.
If a student still can't break the cipher, it makes sense at this point to read and study the published cryptanalysis. If a student can't break any of the ciphersespecially the easy ones-it's a good indication that he should find another line of work.
The lessons are in order, but the ordering is loose in places. The first lessons are easier, but then I try to mix things up a bit. Students should feel free to skip lessons that are hard and go back to them, or even skip a few entirely (there are quite a lot of them). It is also not my intention for a student to fully complete one lesson before going on to the next. A smart student will probably work on several lessons at once.
Good luck.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO "BREAK" A CIPHER?
Breaking a cipher doesn't necessarily mean finding a practical way for an eavesdropper to recover the plaintext from just the ciphertext. In academic cryptography, the rules are relaxed considerably. Breaking a cipher simply means finding a weakness in the cipher that can be exploited with a complexity less than brute-force. Never mind that brute-force might require 2 128 encryptions; an attack requiring 2 110 encryptions would be considered a break. Breaks might also require unrealistic amounts of known or chosen plaintext-2 56 blocks-or unrealistic amounts of storage: 2 80 . Simply put, a break can just be a "certificational weakness": evidence that the cipher does not perform as advertised.
Successful cryptanalysis might mean showing a break against a reduced-round variant of the cipher-8-round DES versus the full 16-round DES, for exampleor a simplified variant of the cipher. Most breaks start out as cryptanalysis against reduced-round variants, and are eventually (maybe years later) extended to the full cipher. In fact, a break on a reduced-round version of a cipher is often a publishable result.
WHY BLOCK CIPHERS?
Academic research in block ciphers has progressed along a different course than research in stream ciphers. Block cipher papers have traditionally been concrete designs (with specific parameters and names) or breaks of those designs. Stream cipher papers are more often general design or analysis techniques, with general applications and examples. While stream-cipher cryptanalysis is at least as important as block cipher cryptanaysis, and in military circles more important, it is much harder to string a course together using existing academic papers. A good survey paper on stream ciphers is available online at http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/technotes.
PREREQUISITES
It will be almost impossible to understand some cryptanalytic results without a good understanding of simple concepts from probability and statistics. The Handbook of Applied Cryptography has a very fast-paced introduction of a great deal of probability theory; however, students learning this for the first time may find that a dedicated textbook on probability and statistics provides a gentler introduction to the subject.
Other topics from discrete mathematics and computer science are also useful, though they are not strictly necessary to know. A student should know, or be prepared to learn, linear algebra, group theory, complexity theory, combinatorics, and graph theory. These could be profitably studied concurrently with cryptanalysis.
It is impossible to really understand a cryptanalytic attack without implementing it. Implementing an attack described in a paper can be very instructive; implementing a new attack of your own invention often exposes subtleties that theoretical analysis fails to. For that reason, mathematical programming in a language such as C is also a required skill.
Historical Background
The cryptanalysis of pre-computer encryption algorithms is not really applicable to the cryptanalysis of modern algorithms, but it makes for interesting reading and is a good example of the mindset required to perform cryptanalysis. I don't consider this a required prerequisite, but the interested student should consider reading Helen Fourche Gaines A careful reading of David Kahn, The Codebreakers (The Macmillan Company, 1967), is indispensible for an understanding of the history of cryptography. I recommend it highly.
OBTAINING COURSE MATERIAL
The papers used in the course come from the proceedings of many different conferences. I have tried to avoid obscure publications, but invariably some have crept in. This means that many good block ciphers are not listed above: CAST is a prime example. Please don't take a cipher's exclusion from the list as evidence of strength or weakness; it is simply a matter of availability.
Almost all papers come from Springer-Verlag conference proceedings, all published in the Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS) series. Most university libraries subscribe to the entire LNCS series. At a minimum, a student should have the CD-ROM consisting of all the Crypto and Eurocrypt proceedings (available from Springer-Verlag), and the proceedings from the Fast Software Encryption (FSE) series. There are many more papers in those proceedings worth reading than the ones listed here.
I maintain a Web page at http://www.counterpane.com with pointers to the papers on the WWW. Among the CD-ROM, the FSE proceedings, and my Web resources, it is possible to do almost everything in the course. , 1997) . Concentrate on the chapters on block ciphers, but I recommend strongly that you read the entire books.
Basic Cryptanalysis
Try to cryptanalyze the following simplified algorithms:
• 8-round RC5 without any rotations.
• 8-round RC5 with the rotation amount equal to the round number.
• 12-round DES without any S-boxes.
• 8 rounds of Skipjack's rule B. (A description of Skipjack can be found on the World Wide Web.) • 4-round DES.
• A generic cipher that is "closed" (i.e., encrypting with key A and then key B is the same as encrypting with key C, for all keys). • 6-round DES.
• 4 rounds of Skipjack's rule A followed by four rounds of Skipjack's rule B.
All of these algorithms are described in B. There are many more attacks, none of which have been published. It is worth spending time on this algorithm, even going back to it again later in this course. As you learn more techniques, you will discover more attacks. further study? They look at the pedigree of the algorithm. An algorithm that has been invented by someone who has shown that he can break algorithms-he's studied the literature, perhaps using this course, and published a few breaks on his own that had not been discovered before-is much more likely to invent a secure cipher than someone who has done a cursory read of the literature and then invented something. In both cases the inventor believes his cipher is secure; in the former case the inventor's opinion is worth something.
Cryptanalysts also look at the supporting documentation associated with the design. Again, design is easy and analysis is hard. Designs that come with extensive analyses-breaks of simplified variants, reduced-round versions, alternate implementations-show that the inventor knew what he was doing when he created the cipher. When we designed Twofish, we spent over 1000 man-hours on cryptanalysis. We wrote a book consisting primarily of cryptanalysis. To us, thislevelofworkiswhatittakestodesignanewcipher.Onlyafterthislevelof analysis by the designers should third-party cryptanalysis start. It's the "price of admission," as it were.
Anyone can create an algorithm that he himself cannot break. It's not even very difficult. What is difficult is cryptanalysis. And only an experienced cryptanalyst can design a good cipher. And the only way to get that experience is to analyze other people's ciphers.
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